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THE HUMAN RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DENIED APPLICATION BEFORE A
DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
HON. GIOVANNI E. LONGO*
INTRODUCTION
On August 17, 1949, on the occasion of the first session of
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Sir Winston
Churchill expressed the wish that once an agreement on Fun-
damental Human Rights was achieved on a European level, it
would be possible to create an International (European) Court
before which any violation of such rights might be submitted for
judgment by the civilized world.1
Churchill's wish reflected the concern that, absent the crea-
tion of an international judicial organ empowered to enforce hu-
man rights, internationally established rules for safeguarding
those rights might remain a mere proclamation of principles.
Recently, Rolv Ryssdal, the present Chief Justice of the
European Court of Human Rights, acknowledged the creation of
such an international judicial organ. He expressed his convic-
tion, however, that it would be impossible for such an interna-
tional court to cope with its tasks without support from national
courts.2 These national courts would ensure that, within the
boundaries of their domestic system, individual victims of hu-
man rights violations were granted the remedies unavailable to
an international court.
President of the Division, Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy.
Winston S. Churchill, Address Before The Council of Europe (Aug. 17, 1949),
in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, 7842 (Robert
Rhodes James ed., 1974).
2 Rolv Ryssdal, Vers une Cour Constitutionnelle Europeenne [On the Road to a
European Constitutional Court], Winston Churchill Lecture given in Florence, Italy,
before the Academy of European Law (June 21, 1991), in Cour (91) 181, 4passim.
ST. JOHN'S LA W REVIEW
Undoubtedly, these same considerations inhered in the re-
marks of Judge Edward Re in a paper presented this year at the
University of Akron School of Law.3 Choosing from among the
several ways in which "internationally accepted moral norms
may become legal norms enforceable by the various organs of
government," he elected to discuss the role of courts, entitling
his remarks "Judicial Enforcement of International Human
Rights."4
In discussing the role of courts in the implementation of
human rights protected by internationally accepted legal norms,
it is customary to refer to the most well-known of those rights:
the right to life; the right to liberty and security of the person;
the right to a fair trial; and the rights of those arrested not to be
subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Taking into account the vital role of the judge in the human
rights system,5 I propose to concentrate on that human right
which may be considered the logical premise of all the others-
the right to an independent and impartial judge.6 Without this
right, the safeguarding of such other rights could not be guaran-
teed.
On the one hand, this choice affords me the opportunity to
dwell briefly on a part of little-known history which concerns the
process of developing international judicial independence stan-
dards. On the other hand, it allows me to speak of a case where
an internationally recognized rule regarding the fundamental
right to be judged by an independent tribunal was denied appli-
cation by a domestic jurisdiction. This case was the subject of a
lively debate in Italy.
3 Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27
AKRON L. REV. 281 (1994).
4 Id. at 286.
" Sargos, "Les principaux domaines d'application de la Convention en droit pe-
nal et un droit civil" in "Convention Europeene des droits de lhomme et droit com-
munautaire," Paris, 1988, at 41.
6 The right to an impartial and independent tribunal is embodied in Article 10
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/811
(1948). This right is also incorporated in Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). European countries included this right in Article
6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, art. 27, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228.
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I. THE PROCESS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
PRINCIPLES ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
It is obvious that the existence in a given country of an inde-
pendent judiciary is necessary to implement the internationally
recognized human right to have an independent and impartial
tribunal adjudicate an individual's case. Following the en-
shrinement of the right to an independent judge in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in a variety of general inter-
national instruments, most states which formerly did not em-
body in their basic laws a similar rule found no difficulty em-
bodying in such laws solemn proclamations regarding judicial
independence.7
On the other hand, problems could, and in fact did, arise
when it became necessary to state, by means of specific, interna-
tionally recognized provisions, the standards needed to ascertain
whether judicial independence existed. This, for instance, in-
volved ascertaining whether, within each legal system, there
were the following appropriate provisions: to prevent the other
state powers from dismissing a judge from his post;8 to assure
See, e.g., Donald T. Fox & Anne Stetson, The 1991 Constitutional Reform:
Prospects for Democracy and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 139, 150 (1992) (discussing incorporation of judicial independence in Colombian
Constitution and creation of new independent Colombian judicial institutions); Rett
R. Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance:
Current Development, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 155, 175 (1993) (discussing inten-
tion of drafters of new Lithuanian Constitution to incorporate judicial independ-
ence); Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L.
REV. 475, 503-04 (1991) (discussing German Democratic Republic's constitutional
amendments to strengthen independence of judiciary); Rajendra Ramlogan, The
Human Rights Revolution in Japan: A Story of New Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 127, 182-90 (1994) (listing multiple factors that affect inde-
pendence of judiciary in Japan); Robert G. Vaughn, Proposals for Judicial Reform in
Chile, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 577, 583-601 (1992-93) (tracing history of judicial in-
dependence from Chile's military government to Chile's present transition govern-
ment). But see, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning, Speaking, and
Acting: Part II Speaking and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1994)
(addressing problems with judicial independence in Peru). See generally PETER
MEYER, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
xxiii, xxxviii-xxxix (Paul Williams ed., 1981) (discussing how principles embodied in
Universal Declaration of Human Rights took on "life of their own").
8 This provision was embodied in Articles 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, SECRETARIAT, SEVENTH UNITED
NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS, REPORT PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT, at 58, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.121/22fRev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.6.IV.1 (1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles].
The Basic Principles consist of twenty principles that serve to assist States in secur-
19961
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judges the freedom from fear of being pursued or sued in court
simply for having disposed of a case in favor of one of the par-
ties;9 to provide for the general security of judges;'0 to assure
them an adequate renumeration, status and dignity of office;"
and to avoid issues of a judicial character being placed under the
adjudicative authority of organs not enjoying the same guaran-
tees of independence. 2
Just a few years after the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 3 the International Association of Judges' deployed in-
tense international preparatory efforts to achieve recognition by
the international community of a nucleus of such standards.
These efforts were, however, dramatically intensified in the
wake of two major international events. First, the Sixth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of
Offenders, held in Caracas in 1980, entrusted to the U.N. Com-
mittee on Crime Prevention and Control in Vienna the task of
drafting guidelines relating to the judiciary's independence."
ing and promoting the independence and impartiality of judges as well as freeing
them from undue influence. Id. The United Nations formally endorsed the Basic
Principles at the General Assembly's 40th session on November 29, 1985, and De-
cember 13, 1985. See G.A. Res. 32, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 205,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985); G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at
255, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985); see also William M. Cohen, Principles for the Estab-
lishment of a Rule of Law Criminal Justice System, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 269,
274-75 (1993) (incorporating Basic Principles in new "Rule of Law" criminal justice
system); Seventh Crime Congress Tackles Problems of World-Wide Crime, Adopts
Milan Plan of Action, UN MONTHLY CHRON., Sept. 1985, at 38 (reporting on U.N.
conference in Milan).
9 This provision is embodied in Article 16 of the Basic Principles. Basic Princi-
ples, supra note 8.
10 This provision is embodied in Article 2 of the Basic Principles. Basic Princi-
ples, supra note 8. See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN
DEFENSE OF RIGHTS: ATTACKS ON LAWYERS AND JUDGES IN 1989 (1990) (providing
approximately 280 detailed accounts of violence or threats against lawyers, judges,
law professors, and law students around the world).
" This provision is embodied in Article 11 of the Basic Principles. Basic Princi-
ples, supra note 8.
12 This provision is embodied in Article 5 of the Basic Principles. Basic Princi-
ples, supra note 8; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13 See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6. See also
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" The creation of the International Association of Juvenile Court Judges was
endorsed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council on June 6, 1952. U.N.
Doc. E/2249 (1952).
" SECRETARIAT, SIXTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF
CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, Caracas, 25 August-5 September 1980,
G.A. Res. 171, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, U.N. Sales
No. E.81.IV.4 (1980).
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Second, at a meeting held in the same year in Geneva, the
United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities appointed a special rapporteur
to whom it entrusted the task of undertaking a study on the in-
dependence and impartiality of judges, jurors and assessors, and
the independence of lawyers.16  On behalf of the Sub-
Commission, the rapporteur was to present subsequently the
findings to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
I do not intend to give here a full list of the various confer-
ences, study-meetings, and congresses in which the International
Association of Judges actively participated and which assisted
the United Nations' special rapporteur with his task. I would
simply mention that, initially at the Seventh U.N. Congress held
in Milan in September 1985, the committee selected over 100 de-
tailed articles, many of which were subdivided into paragraphs
to be included in the principles on the independence of the judi-
ciary. After several meetings of U.N. experts, the collection was
drastically reduced to a mere forty-four articles.
It is not without emotion that I recall the dramatic moments
of the first days of September 1985. Our group of delegates to
the Congress was confronted with the extreme of indifference on
the part of most delegates, and, to an even greater extent, the
persistent efforts of some official delegations determined to op-
pose the success of the draft through accusations that it was
long-winded and repetitive.
The future of the draft was determined one night when a
tightly-knit group of delegates, particularly from non-
governmental organizations in consultative status with the U.N.
(NGO's), reduced the number of its principles to an indispensa-
ble minimum of twenty articles. Any accusation of long-
windedness could no longer be upheld. The next morning, the
opposition was void of excuses and ceased their objections. I
suggest that these delegates lacked the courage to reveal their
true motives-the fear that statement of precise rules might
6 Report on the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1413/Corr.1 (1981).
'7 In 1982, Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, Special Rapporteur, submitted
his final report entitled Report on Measures to Combat Racism and Racial Dis-
crimination and the Role of the Sub-Commission to the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/7
(1982). This report was sent to the Commission on Human Rights. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.411983/4 (1982).
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provide an international indication to the individual states as to
specific guarantees which had to be provided in order to safe-
guard the genuine independence of the judiciary. The opposi-
tion's ultimate capitulation was probably dictated, at least in
part, by their hope that the rules on judicial independence ap-
proved in Milan would remain mere statements of principles.
Fortunately, their expectations were incorrect.
The rules became the United Nations Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary" and were approved in the same
year, 1985, by consensus of the U.N. General Assembly. All gov-
ernments were formally invited to respect the Principles and to
take them into account within the framework of their domestic
legislation and policies. 9
Even more significant than the initial adoption of the Prin-
ciples was the approval by consensus of the General Assembly in
1989 of procedures for their effective implementation.0 This ac-
tion obligated the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
compile a report (drafted on the basis of information from
NGO's) every five years in order to monitor the observance of the
Principles in the various countries throughout the world. Addi-
tionally, in 1990, the International Association of Judges insisted
that the Secretary General of the U.N. indicate in the report the
'8 See notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
'9 See G.A. Res. 32, supra note 8; G.A. Res. 146, supra note 8.20 See U.N. Programme in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Report of the
Secretary General, in 1989 ANNUAL REVIEW OF U.N. AFFAIRS 652-56 (Kumiko Mat-
suura et al. eds., 1992). The committee praised the "visible impact" of the Milan
Plan. Significantly, it was reported that "[many countries were undertaking far-
reaching and comprehensive legal reforms, providing for the improvement of their
criminal justice systems, the transparency of legal proceedings and the protection of
judges and lawyers." Id. at 653. The Assembly adopted resolution 43/99, which wel-
comed:
the efforts made by Member States and the Secretary-General to translate
into action the recommendations contained in the Milan Plan of Action,
and urged those Governments that had not yet done so to inform the Sec-
retary-General about their implementation. The Assembly further stressed
the need for Member States to continue to make concerted and systematic
efforts to strengthen international cooperation in crime prevention and
criminal justice.
Id. at 655.
Finally, in 1990, the General Assembly passed the Implementation of United
Nations Standards and Norms in Criminal Justice. See id. at 751-58. The proce-
dures for U.N. assistance to Governments interested in implementing the Basic
Principles included, inter alia, the "incorporation of the United Nations instruments
in national legislation and making them available in the appropriate language and
form to all concerned." Id. at 757.
[Vol. 70:111
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name of countries which were not yet respecting the Principles.
Eventually, this was in fact done.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT JUDGE AND THE BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENCE: A CASE BROUGHT BEFORE THE
ITALIAN COURTS
The excursus into the development of the Basic Principles
might provide a better understanding of the importance and
value of the kind of rules which were at issue in an actual case.
The case demonstrates the extent to which U.N. Principles se-
curing the right to an independent judge have been given effect
in the domestic court of Italy.
The case challenged a law of 1988 which was designed to,
within certain limits, render judges accountable for damages
caused by serious fault in the exercise of their functions.2 The
challenge was successful in the Italian local court and was sub-
sequently referred for decision to the Constitutional Court of It-
aly.2
2
The referral was argued to the court on the grounds that the
law was not in line with Article 16 of the Basic Principles.23 This
article provides that "judges should enjoy personal immunity
from civil suits from monetary damages for improper acts or
omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions."
It was argued that the new provision on judicial accountabil-
ity should be declared void as unconstitutional because Article
10 of the Italian Constitution requires the Italian legal system
to conform with the generally recognized rules of international
law and the referral directly conflicted with Article 16 of the Ba-
sic Principles.
The referral was rejected by the Constitutional Court mainly
21 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVE 93-98 (1989).
2 Racc. uff. corte cost., opinion n. 18 of 11-19 January, 1989, 34 Giur. It. I, 1989,
62 if.; Trib. ammin. reg. per la Regione siciliana, Catania's Division, May 12, 1988,
Coco v. USL of Acireale, in 33 Giur. It. Cost., 1988, 2962 if.
See Basic Principles, supra note 8.
24 Id. But see CAPPELLETTI, supra note 21, at 94-95 (detailing substantive and
procedural limitations on Italian judicial liability).
2 Art. 10 COST. della Repubblica Italiana, officially published in the Gazzetta
Ufficiale December 22, 1947, translated in, MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE
ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION, app. A (Stanford University Press
1967). Article 10 of the Italian Constitution provides that "[t]he Italian legal order
shall conform to the generally recognized rules of international law." Id.
1996]
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on the basis of two considerations. The Court held that, accord-
ing to the international practice, the norms contained in the
U.N. resolutions "in the form of declaration of principles" are not
compulsory in character, and they do not constitute a "source of
law, although they can have an influence on the formation of
customary practices and agreements modeled upon their con-
tents."26 Furthermore, the Court added, "the principles of im-
munity embodied in the provision invoked was not necessarily
implying total immunity from accountability."27
Commentary on the decision expressed the view that the
Court's second line of reasoning conflicts with the clear wording
of Article 16 of the Basic Principles. Doubts were also cast as to
the accuracy of the Court's view that resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly do not constitute "sources of law." I would
add that in speaking of such resolutions expressed in the Basic
Principles, the Court did not take into account that, at the time
the Court considered the case, the Basic Principles had been but-
tressed by the specific procedures for their implementation.
CONCLUSION
To conclude with the cases I have just referred to, we shall
briefly return to the terms of the basic matter at stake; namely,
the challenge of ensuring the enforcement of internationally ac-
cepted norms and the protection of human rights in the various
domestic legal systems of the world.
This circumstance has occurred in the well-known Nelson
case28 which Judge Re has discussed extensively in his writings.
2' Racc. uff. corte cost., opinion n. 18 of 11-19 January, 1989, 34 Giur. It. I, 1989,
62 ff.; Trib. ammin. reg. per la Regione siciliana, Catania's Division, May 12, 1988,
Coco v. USL of Acireale, in 33 Giur. It. Cost., 1988, 2962 ff.
27 Id.
28See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, (1993). Nelson observed hazards
and reported them to an investigative committee of the Saudi government while
working as a hospital engineer. Id. at 352. As a result of his disclosure, Nelson al-
leged Saudi government agents "shackled, tortured, and beat" him. Id. at 353. Upon
his return to the United States, Nelson sued the Saudi government in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking damages for per-
sonal injury. Id. Nelson asserted that the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 1994). Id. at 354.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that foreign states are not immune
from suits "based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state." Id. In reversing the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that Nelson's suit was not based on "commercial activity by a
foreign state" and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction over the action. Id.
[Vol. 70:111
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Attempts to recognize international norms as binding on domes-
tic courts have met resistance at the highest level of domestic
courts.
And yet, notwithstanding this, I share the optimistic outlook
expressed by Judge Re. 0 I consider the progress which has fol-
lowed the milestone of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to be unstoppable. This is especially the case in the field
of the right of the individual to an independent judge where
dramatic steps forward have been taken in every country. This
is particularly true in Italy, where, as shown by recent judicial
But see Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 167 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1994). In Cicippio, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia affirmed the District Court's holding that the alleged hiring of kidnappers
did not constitute "commercial activity" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
(1988). Id. at 167. The Supreme Court, however, criticized the Nelson Court for
abandoning the Second Circuit's categorical approach. Id. The Second Circuit advo-
cated that "in determining whether a given government activity is commercial un-
der the Act, we must ask whether the activity is one in which commercial actors
typically engage." Id. (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607
(1992)).
2 See Re, supra note 3, at 290-300. In discussing the important role of domestic
courts in enforcing international human rights, Judge Re criticized the Supreme
Court's decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson. Id. at 294-300. The author advocated the
need for congressional intervention to address instances where courts have chosen
not to provide an effective and available remedy to victims of international human
rights violations through the application and reasonable interpretation of existing
legislation. Id. at 298-300; see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrier to
Human Rights Litigation-Is an Amendment Necessary and Possible?, 86 AM. SOC'Y
OF INTL L. PROC. 338, 344 (1992) (citing H.R. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.).
A principle purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign
immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reduc-
ing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assur-
ing litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal
grounds and under procedures that ensure due process.
Id. at 344.
:" See Re, supra note 3, at 288. Judge Re refers to the immunity of the judiciary
as a "benefit to the people" because the separation of powers serves the important
function of removing judges from the political "clamor of the moment." Id. Judge Re
reaffirms the United States as a traditional "beacon of hope" in the area of human
rights and liberties, and calls upon the Supreme Court to continue this legacy and
not to abandon its role as the protector of fundamental human rights. Id.; see also
Edward D. Re, Introductory Remarks, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 465, 467 (1993) (urging
legal profession to "do what is necessary to see to it that courts are granted juris-
diction to hear cases when legal wrongs need to be righted, and when human rights
need to be vindicated"). But see Gennady M. Danilenko, The Changing Structure of
the International Community: Constitutional Implications, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353
(1991) (questioning ability of new world order to reach consensus on normative re-
quirements of generally applicable international law).
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cases reported in the press, the judiciary presently enjoys an in-
dependence which is equal, if not superior, to that of judges in
any other civilized country."'
31 See, e.g., Italian Scandal May Kill Long-Powerful Parties, Big Changes in Po-
litical System Loom, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 26, 1993, at A16 (reporting judiciary's
increased strength resulting from independent investigative role in scandal); George
Melloan, Global View: Sell Il Duce's Patrimony and Save Italy, WALL ST. J., June
14, 1993, at A15 (reporting great effort independent of Italian judiciary in conduct-
ing "massive assault" on political corruption); R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., Political
Anxieties Amid Malgoverno, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at A21 (recognizing judicial
prosecution of Italy's corrupt political class).
But see Lisa Bannon, Italy Gets New President, Ending Month-Long Crisis,
WALL ST. J. EuR., May 26, 1992, at 2 (reporting recent comments regarding criti-
cism of Italian judiciary); Judith Harris, Battling Italy's Golliath, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
July 22, 1992, at 6 (alleging "purposeful negligence" inside sanctuary of Italian ju-
diciary); Ed Vulliamy, Turmoil in Italy; Could Those Responsible be Working From
Within?, MONTREAL GAZETTE, July 31, 1993, at B5 (determining judiciary "radical").
[Vol. 70:111
